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INTRODUCTION
The Pando-Monte Lirio Hydroelectric Power Project (Pando
Project) is located along the Chiriqui Viejo River (CVR) in Western
Panama. It consists of two hydroelectric dams that are part of nineteen
hydroelectric installations planned and partially constructed along the
CVR in Western Panama.1 The Pando Project reflects the Inter-American Development Bank’s (IDB’s) commitment to investments in “clean
energy” in Central America.2 The project is an important contribution
to Central America’s energy needs, but has caused a number of residents and citizen organizations in the CVR region to raise issues
regarding the impact the project will have on the CVR and their livelihoods and way of life.3
The IDB approved a loan for the Pando Project on December 9,
20094 in the amount of $40 million,5 and the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) approved a series of loans on February 4, 2010 for a
total loan risk of $40 million.6 According to the IFC’s Compliance Ad1. WERNER KIENE ET AL., COMPLIANCE REVIEW TEAM OF THE INDEP. CONSULTATION AND
INVESTIGATION MECHANISM, COMPLIANCE REVIEW REPORT, THE PANDO-MONTE LIRIO
HYDROELECTRIC POWER PROJECT, COMPLIANCE REVIEW PANEL TEAM 10 (Sept. 28, 2012),
available at http://www.iadb.org/en/mici/complaint-detail,1804.html?ID=PN-MICI001-2010.
2. Id. at 18.
3. Id. at 12.
4. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN AND INDEP. CONSULTATION AND
INVESTIGATION MECHANISM, CONCLUSION REPORT CAO OMBUDSMAN PROCESS/ICIM
CONSULTATION PHASE 1 (April 2011) [hereinafter CONCLUSION REPORT], available at http://
www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document-links/links-156.aspx.
5. KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 14.
6. OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, APPRAISAL REPORT: PANDO AND
MONTE LIRIO HYDROPOWER, CHIRIQUI VIEJO RIVER, PANAMA 5 (2012) [hereinafter APPRAISAL
REPORT], available at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document-links/links-156.aspx.
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visor Ombudsman Appraisal Report, the investment decision to fund
the Pando Project was made despite the undefined potential cumulative impact of the development on the entire CVR.7 The local
community questioned the validity of the environmental impact assessments related to the Pando Project and maintained a deep distrust
of environmental impact assessments conducted on projects in the
CVR.8
The IDB’s approval process involved intense debate regarding
the approval decision.9 Ultimately, the IDB management recommended engagement in the Pando Project to follow the lead of the other
co-financiers.10 The IDB made the decision to fund on the merits of the
rationale that the existing financiers were going forward with the financing despite the issues and the IDB should remain engaged to
continue progressing towards long-term compliance with the bank’s
environmental and social policies.11 At the loan document signing, the
IDB conditioned the first loan disbursement on a key environmental
study.12 The environmental study failed to meet lender requirements
at disbursement, yet the IDB released the first disbursement as
planned.13 The poorly planned project has been the source of growing
conflict.14
The World Bank Group’s (WBG’s) traditional mandate is to advance human rights through poverty reduction by assisting developing
countries to enhance their infrastructure and economic resources.15
Operating within this WBG framework, the IDB and IFC implement
the mandate for advancing human rights by combating poverty in developing countries.
The new Human Rights and Environment (HRE) paradigm
adds innovative human rights concerns; concerns that are at times at
7.
8.

Id. at 1.
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, OMBUDSMAN ASSESSMENT REPORT:
COMPLAINT REGARDING THE ELECTRON INVESTMENT S.A. PANDO – MONTE LIRIO
HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT (#27975) 8 (July 2010) available at http://www.cao-ombudsman
.org/cases/document-links/links-156.aspx.
9. KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 14, 18.
10. Id. at 18.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 19.
13. PRESS RELEASE, ACCOUNTABILITY COUNSEL AND BANK INFORMATION CENTER, INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AUDIT SHOWS PROJECT THREATENS PANAMANIAN RIVER (Oct.
23, 2012), available at http://www.bicusa.org/idb-pando-monte/.
14. Id.
15. KIM HERBERTSON ET AL., A ROADMAP FOR INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO THE
WORLD BANK GROUP iv. (World Resources Institute, 2010), available at http://www.wri.org/
publication/roadmap-integrating-human-rights-world-bank-group.
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odds with the traditional role of the WBG members to combat poverty
in developing but impoverished communities throughout the world. In
an age of increasing sensitivity to burgeoning corporate citizenship,
the goal to protect human rights affords the WBG opportunities to create substantive beneficial outcomes to millions of people through
proactive engagement of stakeholders incorporated into WBG lending
policies.
Despite the WBG’s progress towards addressing HRE issues,
the efficacy of its role is limited because WBG organizations lack regulatory authority. As Alan Miller, Principal Climate Change Specialist
in the Climate Business Department at the IFC, recently commented,
the IFC is really only a bank and its scope of influence limits it ability
to act as a regulatory agency.16 Miller noted that the WBG’s lending
role allows for some influence, but it lacks the necessary authority to
act fully in a regulatory capacity.17 It is against this backdrop that
WBG entities, such as IFC and IDB, may embrace the opportunity to
further integrate HRE standards into their banking operations.
Ultimately, economic viability is contingent on tenuous margins, making WBG investments riskier than private lender
investments. Borrowers, lenders, governments, NGOs, and other
stakeholders must therefore be cognizant of HRE issues that increasingly put projects at risk. Increasingly, these risks hamper the
advancement of the more traditional human rights objectives of the
WBG. Nevertheless, stricter adherence to WBG HRE policies will lead
to improved risk management and cost control.
A review of the Pando Project’s shortcomings in due diligence
illustrates the need for stricter integration of procedures and evaluation practices in designing and conducting substantive due diligence.
The members of the WBG, along with other multi-national banks and
the complete array of unique stakeholders, benefit from synergistic engagement by avoiding risks that arise from late-emerging HRE issues.
All stakeholders must strive to balance the tenuous financial dimension of economic development projects with the important HRE
concerns raised by stakeholders in developing countries.
Proactive engagement begins with implementing procedural
standards aimed at engaging all stakeholders. Prior to approving project funding, all stakeholders, with the WBG institutions leading the
16. Remarks of Alan Miller, Principal Climate Change Specialist in the Climate
Business Department of the International Finance Corporation, Panel on International
Finance, Human Rights, and the Environment, Fourth Annual Environmental Law and
Justice Symposium, Florida A&M University College of Law (Nov. 8, 2013).
17. Id.
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way, must engage in a dialogue aimed at managing risks and costs,
addressing HRE concerns, and proactively working towards synergistic
solutions. By valuing good corporate citizenship and the need for cost
certainty, the developer must be thoughtful and deliberate in properly
addressing HRE issues.
Development projects face increasing risks of delay and rapidly
escalating costs due to the haphazard attention to proactive due diligence, particularly relating to HRE issues. A proactive and engaged
initial due diligence process leads to earlier solutions to issues, which
leads to reduced risk and lower project costs. The adherence to IFC
Performance Standards or the Equator Principles guides the initial
due diligence and benefits lenders and developers in managing risk
and costs.
Part I of this paper reviews the evolution of the Pando Project
and the IDB’s and the IFC’s funding of the Pando Project in Panama.
Part II reviews the role of the WBG, IDB, and IFC in funding economic
development, including the evolution of the WBG’s traditional role and
its emerging integration of HRE into its lending practices through the
IFC’s Performance Standards and the subsequent development of the
Equator Principles III. Part III reviews the Pando Project’s failure to
fully engage all stakeholders early in the due diligence process. Part IV
proposes that proactive, synergistic engagement in integrating HRE
leads to improved risk management and cost control. Promoting proactive engagement of HRE principles in Multilateral Development
Banks’ (MDBs’) lending practices leads to improved economic development projects and HRE protections through lower project costs,
increased cost certainty, and reduced financial and political risk.
I. THE PANDO-MONTE LIRIO HYDROELECTRIC POWER PROJECT,
CHIRIQUI RIVER, PANAMA
A. Overview of the Pando-Monte Lirio Hydroelectric Power Project
The Pando Project and other IDB-financed dams on the river
impact approximately 21% of the total length of the 128-kilometer
river.18 The developer is Electron Investment S.A.19 Electron Investment S.A. is a joint venture between a Spanish company and a
Panamanian private foundation started by a prominent Panamanian
businessman and politician.20 The IDB approved a loan for the Pando
18.
19.
20.

KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 12.
CONCLUSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
OMBUDSMAN ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
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Project on December 9, 2009,21 in the amount of $40 million,22 and the
IFC approved a series of loans on February 4, 2010,23 consisting of two
loans and an IFC swap for a total loan risk of $40 million.24 The total
initial cost of the project was estimated to be $291.7 million.25 The
companies collectively contributed $109 million in equity to the project.26 The additional funding was derived from $153 million in senior
debt and $30 million in subordinated debt.27 Both the IDB and the IFC
approved loans for the Pando Project as part of a funding consortium of
approximately $180 million.28
The IFC made the investment decision to fund the Pando Project prior to ascertaining the potential cumulative impact of the
development of the entire CVR.29 The appraisal report noted the IFC
was aware of emerging concerns but the IFC maintained it better
served its purpose by continuing to engage in projects to address issues
long term.30 The IFC’s position was that by remaining engaged, the
lender remains influential in ensuring a resolution of the issues surrounding the project.”31 Further, the appraisal report concluded the
IFC should not strictly adhere to its policies because the audit found it
would yield limited information.32
IDB’s approval process was more contentious. Nevertheless,
with other co-financiers moving forward with the decision to finance
the Pando Project, the IDB management ultimately recommended following the lead of the other co-financiers.33 The IDB had to fund the
project rather than insisting on more due diligence and compliance
with lender requirements prior to loan approval.34
In 2002-2003, preliminary environmental impact assessment
reports were prepared for the Pando and Monte Lirio plants.35
21. CONCLUSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
22. KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 14.
23. CONCLUSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
24. APPRAISAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
25. Id.
26. OMBUDSMAN ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
27. KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 12.
28. Accountability Counsel and Bank Information Center, supra note 13.
29. APPRAISAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
30. Id. at 10.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 11.
33. KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 12.
34. Id. at 12.
35. INT’L FIN. CORP., KEY ISSUES & MITIGATION, PANDO MONTE LIRIO: ENVIRONMENTAL
& SOCIAL REVIEW SUMMARY, http://ifcext.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/1ca07340e47a35cd85
256efb00700cee/2B66650654EF01A7852576BA000E32C0 (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). See
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Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM), the local environmental
authority, granted Environmental Licenses in July of 2004.36 These environmental impact assessments, completed early in the development
stage, initially identified the key environmental and social impacts of
the Pando Project along with mitigation measures and plans.37 An improved environmental impact assessment became available in
November of 2009.38 The 2009 environmental impact assessment was
completed by Sustainable Development Advisors and IT Power in September of 2009.39 Hatch, an independent engineering firm, conducted
an independent assessment of the 2009 environmental impact assessment, recommending additional baseline studies prior to construction
due to inadequate studies conducted during the environmental impact
assessment process.40 Hatch recommended the studies include socioeconomic studies and the identification of downstream river users, the
identification of aquatic species and habitats, as well as terrestrial and
avian communities, followed by the development of mitigation plans to
minimize any potential impacts.41 The Lenders are coordinating a cumulative impact assessment to include all ongoing and planned
hydropower projects along the CVR.42 The IFC’s Compliance Advisor
Ombudsman Appraisal Report in 2012 concluded that the IFC policy
provisions had been adhered to despite the emerging concerns.43

also Inter-American Development Bank, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL MANAGEMENT REPORT
(ESMR), 6 (Nov. 20, 2009), available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?
docnum=35003657. The original Category III EIA reports for the Project were prepared in
2002. Separate reports were prepared for the Pando project and the Monte Lirio project. In
December 2002, ANAM requested additional information on ecological flow, impacts on
river users, and implementation schedule of mitigation measures. The requested
information was provided by Electron Investment S.A. in March 2003, and ANAM approved
the two EIAs report in March 2004. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. APPRAISAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
39. IT Power and Sustainable Development Advisors, PRELIMINARY STUDY TO
GENERATE THE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK OF POTENTIAL CUMULATIVE IMPACTS ASSOCIATED
WITH THE CURRENTLY CONCESSION HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHIRIQUI VIEJO RIVER
BASIN – PANAMA, http://ifcext.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/0/2B66650654EF01A7852576BA
000E32C0/$File/7.%20Executive_Summary_of_CIA_2.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
40. Hatch, INDEPENDENT ENGINEER’S EVALUATION OF THE 32-MW PANDO AND 52-MW
MONTE LIRIO GREENFIELD FACILITIES, http://www.hatch.ca/environmental_services_group/
EAM/Projects/pando.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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B. Review of the Complaints Filed by the NGO Alliance
On January 26, 2010, the IFC’s Compliance Advisor
Ombudsman received a complaint letter from Environmental Alliance
for Integral Development–United for Panama (AAPRODIUPA), an alliance of 16 organizations, alleging that the planned Pando Project
violated a number of IFC standards.44 As a result of the policy violations, the complaint letter claimed a number of social and
environmental concerns, including lack of participative consultation
processes with communities, cumulative environmental impact reports, flooding concerns downstream, endangerment of fish and other
species, and limited access to water.45 The Pando Project raises issues
regarding the impact of the project on the CVR and the livelihoods and
way of life of the local and downstream citizens.46 The AAPRODIUPA
claims 80 percent of Panama’s agricultural output comes from the Chiriqui Viejo River watershed.47 Because agriculture is the primary
source of livelihood for many downstream residents, soil and water are
their most important resources and their livelihood depends on soil
and water to sustain their agricultural livelihood.48
The primary issues raised by AAPRODIUPA relate to the quality of the documents and studies available at the time IFC decided to
invest in the Pando Project.49 A related issue was the lack of consultation regarding the documents and studies.50 On March 12, 2010, the
IDB’s Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism received a similar complaint.51
In July of 2010, IFC’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman completed an assessment, and the parties agreed to participate in a
dialogue process facilitated by IFC’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman
and IDB’s Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism to
attempt to reach a mutually agreeable solution to the issues raised by
AAPRODIUPA.52 A variety of meetings were held among the various
stakeholders and, after five months, no agreement was reached.53
IFC’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman and IDB’s Independent Con44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

CONCLUSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
Id.
KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 12.
Id. at 15.
APPRAISAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
Id. at 1.
Id.
KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
CONCLUSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
Id.
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sultation and Investigation Mechanism had entered into an agreement
on February 15, 2011, to conduct a joint consultation process.54 In February of 2011, the IFC’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman deemed the
complaints eligible for assessment, but found not all stakeholders were
interested in participating in a dialogue process.55
Electron Investment S.A. decided in March 2011 that it was no
longer in its interest to continue to participate in the process.56 The
complaint was then transferred to IFC’s Compliance Advisor
Ombudsman compliance division for appraisal in April of 2011.57 Electron Investment S.A. withdrew its participation despite the lenders’
requirement to verify compliance with a series of conditions prior to
the first loan disbursement.58 Due to Electron Investment S.A.’s decision to opt out of the review process, IFC’s Compliance Advisor
Ombudsman and IDB’s Independent Consultation and Investigation
Mechanism terminated the joint consultation process.59 The complaints were then transferred to IFC’s Compliance Advisor
Ombudsman’s compliance function for an appraisal report and to IDB’s
Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism’s Compliance
Review Panel for Eligibility Analysis.60 Following this split, the IFC’s
Compliance Advisor Ombudsman’s and the IDB’s Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism proceed on different paths.
On February 8, 2012, the IFC’s Compliance Advisor
Ombudsman issued an appraisal report in response to the January 26,
2010 letter from AAPRODIUPA outlining alleged violations of IFC policies.61 The IFC’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman appraisal report
concluded the case failed to merit an audit of IFC’s due diligence related to the Pando Project.62 The IFC’s Compliance Advisor
Ombudsman will close this case and take no further action.63 IFC’s
Compliance Advisor Ombudsman’s determined that a compliance audit
would yield limited additional information on the Pando Project.64 On
February 21, 2012, the AAPRODIUPA raised objections and concerns
related to the IFC’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman compliance ap54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 15.
APPRAISAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
CONCLUSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
APPRAISAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
CONCLUSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 15.
CONCLUSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-2.
See APPRAISAL REPORT, supra note 6.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 1.
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praisal report of IFC’s involvement.65 IFC’s Compliance Advisor
Ombudsman’s March 30, 2012, letter in response to AAPRODIUPA’s
objection letter reiterated IFC’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman’s position that the case did not merit an audit of IFC’s due diligence.66
In March 2011, the IDB’s Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism issued a Compliance Review Report on the IDB
loan funding the Pando Project.67 In contrast to the approach by the
IFC’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, the IDB’s Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism conducted a full investigation
and publicly released a Compliance Review Report in September/October 2012.68 The audit confirmed that IDB approved the loan despite
knowledge that significant issues were raised by stakeholders.69
Among the complaints raised by the AAPRODIUPA, this paper will be
limited to reviewing the procedural issues raised with respect to proactive engagement in due diligence.70
The IDB’s Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism Project Ombudsman is tasked in the Consultation phase of the
Compliance Review to mediate among relevant stakeholders as part of
a problem-solving approach.71 The Compliance Review focuses on
whether the IDB’s processes meet relevant policy requirements.72
IBD’s Operational Policies require the Bank to ensure that its financial
resources are only made available in a way consistent with the Bank’s
principles and policies and that they continue to be consistent once assigned and disbursed.73 The Compliance Review Panel concluded that
the claims stem from the handling of design issues on the overall impact on the total CRV and the impact of the altered ecological flow.74
The Compliance Review Panel did not investigate the borrower,
local institutions, and other organizations involved in the project.75
The efficacy of the report is limited by the panel’s mandate to report
65. Letter from Meg Taylor, Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman to Ms. Damris Sanchez,
AAPRODIUPA (March 30, 2012) (on file with author), available at http://www.accountabili
tycounsel.org/communities/current-cases/pando-and-monte-lirio-dams-panama/.
66. Id.
67. See KIENE ET AL., supra note 1.
68. Accountability Counsel, Current Cases: Pando and Monte Lirio Dams, http://www
.accountabilitycounsel.org/communities/current-cases/pando-and-monte-lirio-dams-pan
ama/ (last visited July. 16, 2014).
69. Id.
70. See infra Part III.A.
71. KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 12.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 13.
74. Id. at 14.
75. Id. at 16.
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IDB’s compliance.76 It is not within the scope of the panel’s mandate to
assess the merits of the decision to acquiesce to corporate expediency
or to assess the decisions of the IFC and the other financiers.77 Nonetheless, it is illustrative of a procedural breakdown when the project
approved by the IDB board in December of 2009 was conditioned on the
completion of an ecological flow study prior to the signing of the loan
documents.78
IFC’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman acknowledges the IFC
is well aware of the challenges of funding development projects and
assesses the challenges as part of the decision to fund and further influence outcomes.79 The IFC makes a compelling case that funding
challenging projects and maintaining influence on the outcomes serves
its purpose. If IFC backed out of loans with challenges, the IFC would
significantly lower its lending influence and its ability to fulfill its
mandate. At the signing of the loan agreement, the panel decided to
sign the loan documents only if a flow study would be completed as a
condition precedent to the first loan disbursement.80 While a study was
produced prior to the first loan disbursement, the study was flawed
and found unacceptable by the IDB’s Environmental and Social Safeguards Unit (ESG).81 Despite this conclusion, IDB continued with the
first disbursement.82
The procedural history of the Pando Project loan process by IDB
and IFC illustrates how lender due diligence continues to fall short of
the proactive integration of HRE considerations into the WBG lending
process. The path taken by Electron Investment S.A., IFCs and IDB
highlights the difficulties associated with designing and conducting
project evaluations consistent with HRE concerns of all stakeholders.
It also highlights an apparent lack of will to address concerns proactively and in an engaged manner.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
APPRAISAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 10.
KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 19.
Id.
Id.
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II. MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS: THE CURRENT INTEGRATION
OF ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES INTO FUNDING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Part II provides historical context regarding the development of
the WBG, the IFC, and the IDB. It then discusses the nature and development of the IFC’s Performance Standards. Part II concludes with
a discussion of the recently updated Equator Principles III and the role
of the Equator Principles III in advancing the concept of proactive engagement in due diligence to improve risk management and cost
control.
A. Historical Review of the World Bank Group, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and the International
Finance Corporation
In 1944, as a result of the Bretton Woods Conference, the World
Bank (WB) was formed to assist in the rebuilding of war torn countries
impacted by World War II.83 With the signing of the Marshall Plan in
1944, the WB’s purpose shifted to financing economic development
projects in emerging markets, combating poverty, and advancing
human rights throughout the developing world’s population.84 The WB
and its affiliated banking institutions have a rich history of funding
economic development projects in developing countries throughout the
globe.
The WBG is comprised of a variety of entities lending money for
development projects, providing loan guarantees, and providing dispute resolution procedures to resolve concerns stemming from lending
projects.85 The introduction of HRE adds another dimension of human
right concerns to the WBG’s original mandate, coinciding with the
human rights priorities that guided the WBG from its inception to assist in combating poverty. The United Nations (UN) and numerous
human rights organizations are working to clarify roles and responsibilities, help guide the implementation and to resolve concerns such as
whether human rights are universal, whether human rights reflect
cultural biases, how to resolve such cultural biases, and how to manage
83. The World Bank, World Bank History, THE WORLD BANK: WORKING FOR A WORLD
FREE OF POVERTY, http://go.worldbank.org/W3SF2UKO71 (last visited July 16, 2014)
[hereinafter THE WORLD BANK].
84. Rolf H. Weber & Douglas W. Arner, Toward a New Design for International
Financial Regulation, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 391, 398-399 (2007).
85. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 83.
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conflicting human rights when resources are scare and alternatives are
costly or unavailable.86
Reducing poverty through economic development has traditionally been the driving purpose behind the WBG’s funding activities.87
The new HRE paradigm introduces additional human rights concerns—concerns that are at times at odds with the traditional role of
the WBG.
The World Bank is directed by 188 member countries,88 and the
International Finance Corporation is directed by 184 member countries89 with diverse traditions. This structure developed a culture of
quantifying investments at a national level, aspiring to respect boundaries between the WBG role and the role of each country’s
government.90 It is within this politically diverse web of competing interests that the challenge of integrating HRE into existing WBG
projects and procedures exists. This integration not only requires shifting paradigms and policy modifications by the WBG, but it also
requires the same shifting for member governments, developing country governments, NGOs, private and public development companies,
benefiting communities, and affected communities.
While there are adverse and conflicting objectives among the
parties, the integration of HRE into the existing traditional role of the
WBG is in some ways parallel to traditional concerns for human rights
at the core of the WBG mission.91 The 2012 version of the IFC Performance Standards92 and the June 2013 release of the Equator Principles
III93 include notable revisions that move further in the direction of addressing HRE concerns.
The conflict between developing HRE concerns and traditional
WBG goals in some respects poses a threat of harm to the beneficiaries
of the WBG mandate. HRE concerns could derail or add expense to a
critical economic development project to combat poverty, expending resources otherwise directed towards the project beneficiaries. The added
cost may further reduce the number of development projects to be
funded by the WBG.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

HERBERTSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 2.
Id.
THE WORLD BANK, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, 2 (2013).
Int’l Fin. Corp., 2013 Annual Report: The Power of Partnerships 1 (2013).
HERBERTSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 2.
Id.
See infra note 109.
See infra note 122.
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The economic benefits of HRE protections are difficult to quantify.94 The WBG has often judged investments on the basis of short
term economic returns, diminishing the protection and promotion of
human rights of disadvantaged people in developing countries.95 Internal restraints slow progress, as risk management models fail to adjust
for human rights risks or continue to be refined and developed.96 The
WBG believes fostering conditions in support of the attainment of
human rights is a central objective of its development goals.97 The failure to more fully and systematically integrate human rights into its
policies and programs hampers the WBG from realizing its desired development outcomes.98
The WBG traditionally considered human rights beyond the
scope of its development mandate and considered such human rights
considerations to be political in nature.99 However, the WBG’s existing
activities implicitly promote and protect human rights.100 Despite this
influence, the WBG struggles at times to articulate its role in promoting human rights in developing countries.101 Central to this struggle is
the traditional belief that the WBG acts only in a facilitative role by
assisting members address human rights obligations.102
B. The 2006/2012 IFC Performance Standards
One of the most significant steps towards the integration of
HRE into the WBG lending procedures has been with the IFC’s Performance Standards. On January 1, 2012, the IFC updated its
Performance Standards by further integrating HRE. The IFC’s involvement in high profit and controversial private projects led to the
adoption of “Performance Standards,” a guide for corporate clients in
environmental and social risk management.103 More than 118 finan94. HERBERTSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 2.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2-3.
97. THE INTERNATIONAL BANK OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 2 (The World Bank, 1998) [hereinafter
THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK].
98. HERBERTSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 3.
99. Id. at 9.
100. Id.
101. THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK, supra note 97, at 2.
102. HERBERTSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 9.
103. INT’L FIN. CORP., WORLD BANK GROUP, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY (Jan. 1, 2012), available at http://www.ifc.org/
wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/ifc+sustainability/publica
tions/publications_handbook_pps.
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cial institutions have adopted the Performance Standards.104 The IFC
Performance Standards adhere to several International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions on labor rights, but do not otherwise adhere
to any international human rights customs or norms.105 The updated
2012 Performance Standards replaced the original 2006 IFC Performance Standards.
In addition to the updated IFC Performance Standards, the IFC
prepared a Sustainability Framework that sets out Policy and Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability.106
Through this policy, the IFC aims to advance its commitments to environmental and social sustainability.107 The commitments are based on
IFC’s mission and mandate to fight poverty for lasting results while
helping people help themselves and their environment by providing resources, sharing knowledge, building capacity, and forging
partnerships in the public and private sectors.108 The IFC performance
standards were designed to integrate these commitments into its lending process.109
The IFC promotes sound economic growth, grounded in sustainable private investment, to reduce poverty.110 Central to IFC’s mission
is the IFC’s intent to “do no harm” to people and the environment, to
enhance sustainability and achieve positive development outcomes,
and to ensure costs do not fall disproportionately on the poor or vulnerable.111 The IFC seeks to provide accurate and timely information
regarding its activities, recognizing the importance of disclosing information to manage environmental, social, and governance risks.112
104.
105.
106.

HERBERTSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 23.
Id. at 27.
INT’L FIN. CORP., IFC SUSTAINABILITY FRAMEWORK, POLICY AND PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY (Jan. 1, 2012) [hereinafter IFC
SUSTAINABILITY FRAMEWORK].
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id. at 4.
109. INT’L FIN. CORP., WORLD BANK GROUP, IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON ENVTL.
AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 2 (Jan. 1, 2012) [hereinafter IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS]
(stating the IFC performance standards as Performance Standard 1: Assessment and
Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts; Performance Standard 2:
Labor and Working Conditions; Performance Standard 3: Resource Efficiency and Pollution
Prevention; Performance Standard 4: Community Health, Safety, and Security;
Performance Standard 5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement; Performance
Standard 6: Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural
Resources; Performance Standard 7: Indigenous Peoples; and Performance Standard 8:
Cultural Heritage).
110. IFC SUSTAINABILITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 106, at 4.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 5.
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IFC’s recognition of the business responsibility to respect
human rights means avoiding infringement of human rights and addressing any adverse human rights impacts related to business
activities.113 Each performance standard contains elements related to
human rights dimensions businesses may face in their operations.114
Meeting this responsibility means creating access to effective grievance procedures to facilitate early indications and prompt remediation
of grievances.115 The 2010 iteration of the Performance Standards further integrated the human rights dimensions by recognizing the
concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) for indigenous
peoples.116
Though not providing for FPIC with veto power, the new Performance Standard 7 articulates an FPIC with “consultation plus.”117
“Consultation plus” suggests more than just an acknowledgment and
then dismissal for convenience of any impact on indigenous peoples.118
Where a proposed business activity of a client triggers Performance
Standard 7 that requires FPIC, IFC will now undertake an in depth
review of the client’s process as part of its environmental and social
due diligence.
The IFC’s sustainability framework integrates environmental
and social due diligence into IFC’s overall due diligence of the business
activity under consideration, including the review of financial and
reputational risks.119 The IFC will work to only finance investment activities expected to meet the requirements of the Performance
Standards within a reasonable period of time.120 Persistent delays
could now cost financial support.121

113. Id.
114. IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 109.
115. IFC SUSTAINABILITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 106, at 5.
116. IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 109, at 47 (Performance Standard 7
recognizes indigenous peoples as social groups with distinct identities subject to
marginalization and vulnerable to adverse treatment).
117. Shalanda H. Baker, Why the IFC’s Free, Prior, and Informed Consent Policy Does
Not Matter (Yet) to Indigenous Communities Affected by Development Projects, 30 WIS. INT’L
L.J. 668, 688 (2012).
118. Id. at 699.
119. IFC SUSTAINABILITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 106, at 6.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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C. The Development of The Equator Principles III
The Equator Principles III represents the newest and most innovative standards to date governing lending practices of the private
lending institutions.122 The Equator Principles III are gaining recognition throughout the financing sector for projects in developing
countries.123 First adopted in 2006 based on the IFC Performance
Standards, the Equator Principles III are a financial industry benchmark for determining, assessing, and managing environmental and
social risk in projects.124 The newly released 2013 Equator Principles
III, the third iteration of the principles, made notable advancement in
integrating HRE concepts into the framework of assessing social and
environmental risk.125 The Equator Principles III are aspirational and
are voluntary in nature.126 They represent a baseline framework for
developing internal environmental and social policies, procedures, and
practices.127 The Equator Principles III do not create any rights or liability to or for any public or private person or entity.128
The 2013 Equator Principles III reflect two notable advancements that represent important new approaches in international
lending standards.129 First, Principle 5 is innovative in the development of the “stakeholder engagement” concept.130 This principle
provides that a client must demonstrate effective engagement as an
ongoing process in a structured and culturally appropriate manner
with “affected communities” and, where relevant, “other stakeholders.”
For a project with potentially significant adverse impacts on “affected
communities,” clients shall conduct an “informed consultation and participation process.”131 Second, Principle 5 recognizes the vulnerability
122. See generally THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES III, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES III FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, (June 2013), www.equator-principles.com [hereinafter the Equator Principles
III] (promoting sustainable environmental and social performance for improved financial,
environmental and social outcomes).
123. Id.
124. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES III, supra note 122.
125. Id. at 2. The Equator Principles III were adopted by the Equator Principles III
Financial Association (EPFI) and managed by the Equator Principles III Association, an
unincorporated association of members of the EPFI, whose object is the management,
administration, and development of the Equator Principles III. There are currently
seventy-eight member financial institutions in the EPFI.
126. Baker, supra note 117, at 2.
127. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES III, supra note 122, at 11.
128. Id.
129. Baker, supra note 117, at 1.
130. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES III, supra note 122, at 7.
131. Id. at 7.
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of indigenous peoples and adverse impacts on indigenous peoples require FPIC.132 The Equator Principles III recognize the fact that FPIC
is not universally defined.
III. THE PANDO PROJECT’S FAILURE TO FULLY ENGAGE
INTEGRATION OF HRE PRINCIPLES IN INITIAL
PROJECT DUE DILIGENCE

IN THE

The Pando Project exemplifies how more diligent adherence to
the IFC and IDB lending standards could have dramatically improved
the outcome of the Pando Project for all stakeholders, including positive outcomes for IFC, IDB, and Electron Investment S.A. The
resulting costs expended on multiple flow reports and environmental
impact assessments, as well as the time and money spent conducting
multiple conferences with stakeholders, could have been mitigated by
proactively engaging stakeholders and conducting adequate testing
early in the due diligence phase.
Once the concerns were raised by AAPRODIUPA and negotiations failed to progress, Electron Investment S.A. disengaged, and both
the IDB and the IFC followed suit.133 Electron Investment S.A., IDB,
and IFC fell short of full engagement in the initial due diligence and
continued to be disengaged after the complaint letter filed by AAPRODIUPA.134 Notably, the current concept of engagement developed
during the initial stages of the Pando Project. The Pando Project began
under the IFC’s 2006 Performance Standards;135 however, it was the
2010 Performance Standards that more fully developed and addressed
the concept of engaging with stakeholders and proactively integrating
HRE issues.136 This section discusses more stringent integration of the
2010 Performance Standards and how effective engagement with
stakeholders early in the due diligence process could have resulted in
more positive outcomes for Electron Investment S.A., IDB, and IFC. At
the same time, more effective due diligence provides an engaging process for stakeholders to achieve amicable solutions to their concerns
surrounding the Pando Project. While not proposing to mandate adher132. Id. at 7-8.
133. KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 15.
134. Id.
135. INT’L FIN. CORP., WORLD BANK, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND GUIDANCE NOTES 2006 EDITION (2007), available at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/
IFC_External_Corporate_Site/ifc+sustainability/sustainability+framework/Sustainability+
Framework+-+2006/Performance+Standards+and+Guidance+Notes/.
136. See PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY,
supra note 103.
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ence to the 2010 Performance Standards, this paper illustrates how the
WBG organizations and project developers can be motivated to adhere
more stringently to the Performance Standards to manage risk and
control project costs.
A. Human Rights and Environment Principles Not Fully and
Effectively Integrated Into the Pando Project
The Pando Project affords an opportunity to analyze the due diligence process and illustrate the importance of timely and effective due
diligence. The IBD Compliance Review Report raised five notable concerns where proactive engagement with stakeholders early in the due
diligence process may have mitigated, if not eliminated, the AAPRODIUPA’s complaints.
The five concerns include the: 1) lack of an adequate flow control study early in the project planning; 2) absence of a comprehensive
environmental impact assessment addressing the cumulative impacts
of the planned investments in the watershed; 3) unsatisfactory consultation process with affected communities; 4) lack of effective
participation by the leaders and citizens of the affected communities;
and 5) lack of disclosure of the impact of the Pando Project on the affected communities and the CVR basin.137 The absence of early
stakeholder engagement resulted in conflicts with the lending standards articulated in the IFC Performance Standards.
The first concern is one of the two most critical substantive issues: the lack of an adequate flow control study. Electron Investment
S.A.’s failure to complete an adequate flow control study and assess the
HRE impact on the local population depending upon the river, including the populations downstream, conflict with IFC Performance
Standards 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Performance Standard 1 addresses the assessment and management of environmental and social risks and
impacts.138 Environmental and socials risks refers to “any change, potential or actual, to (i) the physical, natural, or cultural environment,
and (ii) impacts on surrounding community and workers, resulting
from the business activity to be supported.”139 A flow control study was
critical because it was essential in identifying such environmental and
social risks.
137. See generally KIENE ET AL., supra note 1; see also OMBUDSMAN ASSESSMENT REPORT,
supra note 8.
138. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY, supra
note 103, at 2.
139. Id. at 5.
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Absent an adequate flow control study, an effective Environmental and Social Management System could not be developed and
limited stakeholder engagement was conducted with affected communities in the early due diligence phase.140 The type of stakeholder
engagement required by Performance Standard 1 includes stakeholder
analysis and engagement planning, disclosure of information, consultation, informed consultation and participation, external
communications and ongoing reporting to the affected communities.141
In the public consultations, the concern regarding the availability,
quality, and credibility of the existing studies and reports was
raised.142 This lack of an adequate flow control study is prima facia
evidence that Performance Standard 1 was not effectively addressed in
the preliminary due diligence.
Performance Standard 3 recognizes that increased economic activity increases pollution at the local, regional, and global levels and
more effective resource utilization reduces pollution.143 This Performance Standard comes into play when considering the sustainable use of
water resources. A comprehensive flow control study would illuminate
the adverse impact on downstream water resources and enlighten the
stakeholders regarding necessary pollution prevention mitigation. One
potential impact of reduced water flow to the surrounding rainforest is
the potential need to mitigate an increase in greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions.144
The inadequate flow control study further violates Performance
Standard 4 by not allowing stakeholders to anticipate the adverse impact on health and safety resulting from the reduced availability of
clean water for consumption and irrigation.145 The water flow modification has the potential to adversely impact clean water sources and
should have been thoroughly addressed early in the due diligence
process.
Performance Standard 5 aims to avoid and minimize the adverse impact, both social and economic, from land acquisition and
140. Id. at 7.
141. Id. at 13-15.
142. OMBUDSMAN ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 18.
143. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY, supra
note 103, at 22.
144. INT’L. FIN. CORP., WORLD BANK GROUP, UNDERSTANDING IFC’S ENVIRONMENTAL AND
SOCIAL DUE DILIGENCE PROCESS, (October 2011), available at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/
connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/ifc+sustainability/feature_oct2011_
esprocess.
145. Id.
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restrictions on land use.146 In this case, an adequate water flow control
study to identify the downstream impact prevents stakeholders and
Electron Investment S.A. from mitigating downstream impacts. To the
extent local communities were displaced by the resulting low water
flow, Electron Investment S.A. was not armed with adequate knowledge to mitigate these concerns with affected stakeholders.
Finally, Performance Standard 6 addresses the protection and
conservation of biodiversity.147 An adequate flow control study is a prerequisite to assessing the impact of changing water flow on the fish
and the surrounding ecosystem. There is no plausible way to assess the
impact and promote sustainable management of living natural resources without an adequate flow control study.148
The second critical substantive issue is the absence of an adequate environmental impact assessment of the planned investment in
the watershed.149 Similar to the flow control study, an inadequate environmental impact assessment inhibits the adherence to Performance
Standards 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6.150 The concerns raised by the inadequate
environmental impact assessments broadly address the impact relative to the numerous dam projects throughout the Chiriqui River Basin
in Western Panama.
Although beyond the company’s scope of influence, Electron Investment S.A.’s inability to participate in an adequate comprehensive
environmental impact assessment raises important concerns. Performance Standard 1 was compromised because a comprehensive
environmental impact assessment is critical to assessing the environmental and social risks resulting from the cumulative development of
the CVR basin. An effective Environmental and Social Management
System was not in place at the time of loan approval.151 IDB is still
exploring opportunities with ANAM and other Panamanian authorities to address appropriate management of the collective watershed.152
The lack of a comprehensive environmental impact assessment pre146. UNDERSTANDING IFC’S ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL DUE DILIGENCE PROCESS, supra
note 144.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 15.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 12.
152. Inter-American Development Bank, Pando-Monte Lirio Hydroelectric Power
Project: Management’s Proposed Action Plan in Response to the Independent Consultation
and Investigation Mechanism’s Compliance Review Report (January 25, 2013) [hereinafter
IDB Proposed Action Plan], available at http://www.iadb.org/en/mici/complaint-detail,1804
.html?ID=PN-MICI001-2010.
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cludes meaningful engagement with affected stakeholders and
communities throughout the watershed early in the due diligence process. The scope of the hydroelectric power projects within the CVR
basin mandates the involvement of the Panamanian government in a
comprehensive EIA.
A comprehensive environmental impact assessment potentially
expands significantly the number of stakeholders. Such an expansive
study is essential to comply with Performance Standard 1, which includes stakeholder analysis and engagement planning, disclosure of
information, consultation, informed consultation and participation, external communications, and ongoing reporting to affected
communities.153 The impact of an inadequate comprehensive environmental impact assessment and the inability to proactively engage with
a broader scope of stakeholders contributes to the scope of the ongoing
concerns raised by AAPODIUPA.
An adequate comprehensive environmental impact assessment
illuminates the pollution impact across the entire river basin. The application of Performance Standard 3 provides for consideration of the
broad impact of pollution on water resources and informs a broader
range of stakeholders of the potential need to take preventive action.
The key stakeholder at this level may be the Panamanian government.
Empowered by an adequate comprehensive environmental impact assessment, the Panamanian government could utilize the
comprehensive assessment in the overall management of Panama’s
natural resources.154
A comprehensive environmental impact assessment provides
for more adequate adherence to Performance Standard 4 by identifying
a broader range of adverse impacts on the overall health and safety of
the CVR basin, particularly with respect to the availability of clean
water for consumption and irrigation. The overall impact of the multiple dam projects throughout the CVR basin has potential adverse
consequences and all parties would have benefited by addressing those
consequences to mitigate the impact on community health and safety.
With respect to Performance Standard 5, a comprehensive environmental impact assessment would be essential to identify the
adverse impact of the entire hydroelectric project from land acquisition
and restrictions on land use. Without comprehensive impact assess153. UNDERSTANDING IFC’S ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL DUE DILIGENCE PROCESS, supra
note 144.
154. E.g., OMBUDSMAN ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 10 (stating that the impact
of lack of water flow to the rainforest in the river basin region could adversely impact
greenhouse gas emissions).
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ments, the stakeholders and Electron Investment S.A. would be unable
to mitigate the broader adverse impact. Electron Investment S.A., the
Panamanian government and other hydroelectric project developers
were not armed with the knowledge to address with key stakeholders
the extent to which regional communities were displaced by the overall
hydroelectric dam development in the CVR basin.
Finally, Performance Standard 6 addresses the protection and
conservation of biodiversity. An adequate comprehensive environmental impact assessment is essential in providing the proper impact of
the overall hydroelectric dam development in the CVR basin to fully
address the protection and conservation of the CVR basin’s biodiversity. There is no plausible way to adequately assess the environmental
impact on a broader ecological scale without an adequate comprehensive environmental impact assessment. To comply with Performance
Standard 6, the parties must succeed in pushing for a comprehensive
environmental impact assessment to promote sustainable management of living natural resources throughout the CVR basin.
The final three issues, (1) the unsatisfactory consultation with
affected communities and lack of meeting with stakeholders, (2) the
lack of participation by affected citizens, and (3) the lack of disclosure
early in the project due diligence, all fail to adhere to Performance
Standard 1.155 Performance Standard 1 specifically addresses the
need to consult with stakeholders, to allow affected citizens to participate, and to disclose plans to the affected citizens. Without an
adequate flow control study and an adequate comprehensive environmental impact assessment, Electron Investment S.A. could not
effectively disclose to the relevant stakeholders the expected impact
from the project. Moreover, without adequate disclosed information,
stakeholder participation and ability to consult with Electron Investment S.A. is handicapped by the lack of adequate information. At the
time of the IFC’s decision to invest in the Pando Project, the details of
the potential cumulative impact of the entire CVR basin remained
undefined.156
Performance Standard 1 contains provisions for stakeholder engagement as the basis for building strong, constructive, and responsive
relationships to successfully manage the project’s environmental and
social impacts.157 The IFC maintains that Performance Standard 1 in155. KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 15.
156. ACCOUNTABILITY COUNSEL AND BANK INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 13.
157. INT’L FIN. CORP., IFC SUSTAINABILITY FRAMEWORK: PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 21
(2012), available at https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/84697434?access_key=key-1do8v46kz
f4u4h6nu17e.
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cludes stakeholder engagement, which includes the disclosure and
dissemination of information and consultation and participation.158
The disclosure of relevant information regarding the Pando Project
would help the stakeholders understand the risks, impacts, and opportunity presented by the project.159
The foregoing highlights key concerns raised by the early due
diligence for the Pando Project and juxtaposes the key issues with the
relevant IFC Performance Standards. The IDB maintains that its continued involvement, as opposed to withdrawing, has facilitated the
ultimate receipt of the necessary studies.160 The IDB board approved a
proposed action plan on February 13, 2013, outlining progress made
since the Compliance Review Report.161 The proposed action plan also
laid out recommendations to address remaining concerns, along with
assigning responsibility and deadlines.162
The IDB maintains that the process, while admittedly not optimal, is leading toward a satisfactory resolution of the key issues: the
ecological flow control issue and the development of the river basis
management with the benefit of a cumulative impact analysis.163 The
IDB continues to pressure Electron Investment S.A. into compliance
and continues to foster a positive environment for the resolution of the
issues. 164 While moving towards ultimately addressing the concerns
raised in the complaints filed by AAPRODIUPA, the lack of proactive
engaged due diligence has led to significantly increased due diligence
costs and additional resources consumed addressing the concerns being raised by the various stakeholders.
B. The Cost of Neglecting HRE Issues Evidenced
by the Pando Project
While it is difficult to ascertain the total costs attributable to
insufficient engagement during the initial due diligence, the additional
studies resulting from the complaint, the studies created post loan disbursement, and the additional negotiations and meetings required to
overcome the inevitable lack of trust increases the overall costs well
beyond the initial budget. Even with IDB’s proposed action plan ap158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 76.
IDB PROPOSED ACTION PLAN, supra note 152.
Id. at 2-6.
KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 76.
Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\9-2\fam109.txt

2014

unknown

Seq: 25

8-APR-15

PANAMA’S PANDO AND MONTE LIRIO DAMS

11:53

527

proved in February of 2013, addressing the issues raised in IDB’s
Compliance Review requires further cooperation from Electron Investment S.A. and ANAM.165
ANAM has asked for support to carry out ecological flow studies
and cumulative impact studies of dams on the entire Chiriqui Viejo
watershed.166 ANAM’s weak institutional capacity and lack of personnel to address the environmental problems arising out of these projects
creates further difficulty.167 Electron Investment S.A. has the staff and
resources to do it, but there is a lack of trust that ANAM will enforce or
implement mitigation measures. The lack of trust between parties
leads to higher costs as lengthier negotiations become necessary to develop mitigation measures addressing the HRE issues.
The costs of inadequate due diligence and adherence to HRE
principles can be severe. The IFC incurred excessive costs in 2003
when it began financing palm oil-processing facilities in the
Ukraine.168 In this instance, the IFC’s CAO audit found due diligence
reviews were not conducted as required by IFC policy.169 The findings
gained traction and the WBG suspended further IFC palm oil investments subject to a sector-wide review, which extended to the IFC’s
entire agribusiness operations.170 This was costly not just to IFC, but
also to the Wilmar Group and other agribusiness operators that procure lending from the IFC.
The IDB compliance review report suggests several steps to
remedy the non-compliance and systems problems.171 IDB’s proposed
action plan builds upon those remedies.172 For the Pando Project, the
IDB report suggests creating an Independent Monitoring Committee,
making changes to the current construction design, and establishing a
Civil Safety Bond.173 For ANAM, the IDB report suggests the appointment of suitable independent personnel to implement monitoring plans
in the watershed, conduct the necessary studies within the watershed,
halt the process for granting water concessions until a Watershed
Management Plan is in place, and implement a Watershed Management Plan.174
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

IDB PROPOSED ACTION PLAN, supra note 152.
KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 45.
Id. at 82.
HERBERTSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 15.
Id.
Id.
KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 82.
IDB PROPOSED ACTION PLAN, supra note 152.
KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 82.
Id. at 83.
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The IDB’s proposed action plan approved early in 2013 advances a plan to collaborate with AMAN to complete this task.175 The
Watershed Management Plan to be formed with AMAN would include
participatory workshops, provide support for other necessary studies,
and ensure funds exist to implement the Watershed Management
Plan.176
IV. ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT OUTCOMES
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS THROUGH PROACTIVE
AND SYNERGISTIC ENGAGEMENT

IN

Part IV analyzes how a more proactive engagement in the early
due diligence would have minimized risk and lowered costs with the
Pando Project. The section then assesses the efficacy of adhering to
IFC Standards and the Equator Principles III as stringent guidelines
with resulting decreases in risk and greater cost controls for Multilateral Development Banks (MNB). Finally, Part IV concludes by
illustrating how synergistic engagement among stakeholders leads to
better project due diligence outcomes.
A. Proactive and Synergistic Engagement Applied
to the Pando Project
The Pando Project illustrates how MNBs and their borrowers
benefit from adhering to either the IFC Performance Standards or the
Equator Principles III when conducting due diligence prior to economic
development projects. The IFC’s Performance Standards have become
the leading benchmark for environmental and social risk management.177 With the growing attention on HRE principles and the HRE
issues related to development projects, there is an emerging need for
lenders and developers to proactively engage stakeholders to amicably
resolve HRE issues in the early stages of project due diligence.
With significant adverse consequences disclosed, under Performance Standard 1 for example, a borrower would conduct an
Informed Consultation and Participation to allow stakeholders to exchange views and information as informed participants.178 Once
175. IDB PROPOSED ACTION PLAN, supra note 152.
176. KIENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 83.
177. INT’L FIN. CORP. THE WORLD BANK, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR SUSTAINABILITY 6 (July
2012), available at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_cor
porate_site/ifc+sustainability/publications/publications_brochure_businesscaseforsustaina
bility.
178. Id. at 22.
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disclosed, the stakeholders then benefit from the opportunity to express views and the extent and degree to which consultation takes
place is consistent with the risk and adverse impact of the project.179
Without adequate comprehensive information, the inability to identify
all the potential stakeholders prevents the degree of engagement contemplated by Performance Standard 1. A lack of adequate disclosure
results in consultation and participation inconsistent with the objectives of Performance Standard 1.180 The suggestions to remedy the
concerns raised by AAPRODIUPA in the complaint letter would have
been more effectively considered, with less expense and fewer delays,
by implementing the Watershed Management Plan earlier in the project due diligence.181
The Watershed Management Plan proposed in the IDB Management’s proposed action plan, developed in compliance with IFC
Performance Standards would have alleviated a substantial amount of
the unplanned costs and expensive time delays.182 In addition, the
trust issues and problems associated with this project threaten to manifest themselves in future projects involving the stakeholders. As a
result, Electron Investment S.A.’s project costs will continue to increase beyond the initial budgeted costs. These avoidable additional
costs result from the lack of proactive engagement in the initial due
diligence process.
Fully engaging with stakeholders promises to improve the impact the WBG and other MNBs have upon developing nations
throughout the world. It is within the historical context of the WBG
purpose and structure that the WBG is positioned to advance the
evolution of the integration of HRE into the MND’s lending paradigm.
The benefits of engaging in the implementation of HRE consideration in the initial due diligence are compelling. The IFC’s
Environmental and Social Due Diligence process provides a model in
developing procedures to engage stakeholders. The first step in the
process is an agreement between the Lender and the Borrower to work
together.183 By simply agreeing to work together, MDBs fall short and
must position themselves to engage in the process. On the other hand,
179. Id. at 22.
180. Id. at 14.
181. See discussion supra Part I.B.; see also IDB PROPOSED ACTION PLAN, supra note
152.
182. IDB PROPOSED ACTION PLAN, supra note 152.
183. UNDERSTANDING IFC’S ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL DUE DILIGENCE PROCESS, supra
note 144.
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NGOs and stakeholders must understand the limited influence and enforcement ability the MDBs have as regulatory bodies.184
MDBs benefit from borrowers adhering to bank standards pertaining to HRE issues, whether the policies are bank specific
standards, the IFC Performance Standards, or the Equator Principles
III. As evidenced by the Pando Project, Electron Investment S.A.
agreed to work with the IDB and the IFC, but did not adequately perform early due diligence with adequate flow control studies, adequate
environmental impact assessments, and by fully engaging with a broad
array of stakeholders in a meaning and productive way. Adherence to
HRE principles is realized through diligent good faith compliance with
the chosen standard, whether that standard is the IFC’s Performance
Standards, the Equator Principles, or another comparable variation.
In complying with HRE principles, borrowers and lenders will be best
served through a more meaningful engagement with the stakeholders,
NGOs, applicable government agencies, other lenders and the
developer.
While Electron Investment S.A. acknowledges some of the complaints raised are legitimate concerns, Electron Investment S.A.
maintains the company has already done more than required by IFC
policies and the Panamanian government.185 Electron Investment S.A.
maintains they have expended significant resources to “do the right
thing,” including setting up four Community Development Committees
(CDCs) in 2010.186 The CDCs provided valuable mechanisms for communicating with local communities, but Electron Investment S.A.
would have been much better served by setting up the CDCs earlier in
the due diligence process.187 Ultimately, the lack of early attention to
due diligence resulted in higher costs to Electron Investment S.A., the
IDB, and the IFC.
The second step in the IFC’s Due Diligence Process is to review
and agree on the next steps.188 This is the critical point where the borrower, lenders, and stakeholders should all be mindful of the balancing
of interests in most development projects and work towards solutions
that maximize the benefits while minimizing the negative conse184. See Miller, supra note 16.
185. ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 13.
186. Id. (beginning in February of 2010, EISA created four CDCs “for the purpose of
creating a communication mechanism with the local communities, identifying social
investment projects, implementing social aid programs, and involving the community in
reforestation and mitigation measures.”).
187. Id.
188. UNDERSTANDING IFC’S ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL DUE DILIGENCE PROCESS, supra
note 146.
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quences.189 This stage provides a key opportunity to identify potential
risks specific to a particular development project.
At this stage, the lender provides the borrower IFC’s Performance Standards and relevant WBG Environmental, Health and Safety
(EHS) Guidelines and other supporting documents.190 The IFC Environmental and Social team engages with the borrower by asking the
borrower to provide key information regarding assets and the management plan for environmental and social risks and impacts.191 This is
where the lender, along with the borrower, make key lasting decisions
regarding the scope of the initial due diligence. The lender and borrower benefit from deriving a risk management plan at this early due
diligence stage.192
The commitment to the proactive engagement with stakeholders regarding environmental and social issues starts here to be most
effective. Depending on the quality of the borrowers’ initial due diligence at this stage, the lender and borrow develop a plan to reasonably
identify all anticipated stakeholders, assess the project against the IFC
Performance Standards, Equator Principles III, or equivalent bank
policies or procedures. At this point, the borrower and lender engage
the known and identified stakeholders, including governments, for preliminary due diligence reviews and problem identification.
Once complete, the lender generates an Environmental and Social Review Summary and Environmental and Social Action Plan.193
The summary and plans are approved by the lender and borrower, and
possible key stakeholders that may be strategically included.194 Once
approved by the lender and borrower, the project is publicly disclosed
and consultations begin with the community.195 The lender and borrower should now be prepared to fully engage with identified
stakeholders and remain open to identifying additional stakeholders
not evident in the initial plan development.
More often in the early stages, risk management should continue to be assessed in the background. Risk management involves
189. INT’L FIN. CORP., RISK TAKING: A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 7 (World
Bank Group, 2012).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 6 (outlining a four step risk management plan: 1) inventory of all risk; 2)
measure and decided which risks to hedge, avoid or retain; 3) select course of action to hedge
risk; and 4) determine risk dimensions and organization structure to address risk).
193. UNDERSTANDING IFC’S ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL DUE DILIGENCE PROCESS, supra
note 146.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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ongoing risk assessment, risk evaluation, and risk reporting with decision points assessing any necessary adjustments.196 For projects that
likely will have potentially significant adverse impacts on the affected
stakeholders and for projects where one group of stakeholders are indigenous peoples, the lender should determine the required level of
community support necessary to justify the adverse impact or the impact on indigenous people.197 If Electron Investment S.A. had
diligently engaged in the foregoing early due diligence progression,
Electron Investment S.A., IDB, and IFC, through active engagement
with stakeholders, would have ascertained early in the process the risk
of moving forward without an adequate flow control study and environmental impact assessment.
Once fully engaged and once stakeholders have been fully informed, consulted, invited to participate, and advised of grievance
procedures, then the lender and borrow finalize the investment agreement.198 In this final investment agreement, the terms of the
Environmental and Social Review Summary and Environmental and
Social Action Plan are integrated along with any other environmental
and social commitments.199
Under the IFC model of the Environmental and Due Diligence
Process, funds are not disbursed until the client meets the disbursement conditions.200 The disbursement conditions must be clear and
fully agreed by the borrower, lender, and, sometimes, the key stakeholders. This was another critical turning point in the Pando Project.
The IFC and IDB made the first disbursement despite not having an
adequate flow control report as required.201 Once funds are disbursed
to the borrower, the lender’s leverage is diminished as the borrower
allocates the funds to the project and lender is vested with money in
the project. While the lender and borrower can follow the steps outlined in the due diligence process, if the lender fails to hold the
borrower accountable, the outcome is jeopardized. Lenders and borrowers benefit considerably by actively adhering to due diligence
standards as the risk of neglecting HRE issues is becoming more
pronounced.
196. RISK TAKING: A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 189, at 28.
197. UNDERSTANDING IFC’S ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL DUE DILIGENCE PROCESS, supra
note 146.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Accountability Counsel and Bank Information Center, supra note 13.
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B. Adhering to IFC Standards and Equator Principles III Leads to
Lower Risks and Costs to Multilateral Development Banks
Adhering to IFC Standards and the Equator Principles III benefits the lenders and the borrowers, as well as the stakeholders and
affected communities. One key to motivating lenders and borrowers to
fully engage lies partly in the recognition of the risk management benefits derived from engaging in complete due diligence. According to the
IFC, the business case for integrating HRE into the due diligence process centers on the understanding of business risk and the
mainstreaming of environmental, social, and governance factors in investment analysis and firm valuation.202
Risk comes in many varieties. First, of course, there is financial
risk. Second, there is risk to a company’s reputation, whether lender or
borrower. Third, there is political risk. The WBG, and particularly the
IFC, has played a leading role in facilitating private investments in the
development of improving human rights conditions and minimizing
project-related risks.203 By doing so, the WBG minimizes risk to its
own reputation and, in fact, enhances its reputation, thus reducing
business risk.204
The failure to engage in adequate due diligence and adhere to
lending standards risks substantial financial consequences. The filing
of complaints, the response to complaints, and the growing risk of litigation all produce real financial risk. Both the lender and borrow stand
to significantly benefit from reductions in financial risk.
The risk to reputation takes on a larger role in today’s business
climate. In an age of branding, business good will, and good corporate
citizenship, the risk associated with ignoring HRE issues or, worse,
simply ignoring known issues in HRE, puts a company at risk of losing
future projects and developing an adverse reputation among NGOs.
This negative increased attention draws greater scrutiny to future
projects. The impact of the growing scrutiny has a financial dimension.
As an example, due to the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, BP has lost more
than $32 million a day in brand value. At one point, BP’s market value
dropped from $184 billion to $96.5 billion.205 Sustainability is becoming a bigger and bigger factor in business strategies.206
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

HERBERTSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 14.
Id.
Id.
THE BUSINESS CASE FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 177, at 2.
Id.
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In modern business, companies are increasing being proactive
in managing brands and reputations. Research from the World Bank
Institute suggests that government investment projects financed by
the WB have an economic return 8 to 22% higher in countries with the
strongest civil liberties.207 Larger and mid-size companies are taking
longer-term views toward managing environmental and social risks to
achieve better growth and cost savings, to improve brand and reputation, to strengthen shareholder relations, and, of course, to increase
profits.208 There is a positive relationship between good environmental
and social performance and the financial performance of a company.209
The correlation was stronger in sectors dealing with natural
resources.210
Along these lines, businesses in today’s business environment
must be more aware of their social impact. The benefit of socially responsible business practices, including proactively engaging in HRE
focused due diligence, leads to lower business risk, improved financial
outcomes, improved branding and reputation, and international recognition as a leading investor in developing countries. The value of such
positive outcomes is the attraction of new investments, greater acceptance of projects by NGOs and governments, and a “social license” to
operate. These positive outcomes encourage business to improve development effectiveness.
C. Proactive and Synergistic Engagement Among Stakeholders
Leads to Better Project Due Diligence Outcomes
The Equator Principles III, with its third iteration released in
June of 2013, make further key shifts towards solidifying the full integration of HRE issues in the international economic development
lending process.211 The 2013 Equator Principles III embrace the concept of engagement of HRE issues. No longer is it enough to simply
adhere to procedural requirements of disclosures, information dissemination, inviting participation, and consulting with stakeholders.
207. HERBERTSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 16.
208. Id.
209. THE BUSINESS CASE FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 177, at 3 (citing Eccles G.R.,
Ioannou I. Serafeim G., The Impact of a Corporate Culture of Sustainability on Corporate
Behavior and Performance, Harv. Bus. Sch. (Nov. 2011)).
210. Id. at 3.
211. See generally EQUATOR PRINCIPLES III, supra note 122 (adding to concept of
engagement of stakeholder and FPIC).
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Instead, borrowers and lenders must engage in these activities and be
proactive in addressing HRE issues.212
Two key principles contained in the 2013 iteration support the
development of an “engagement” standard. Principle 5, Stakeholder
Engagement, directly supports the concept of engaging with stakeholders.213 This engagement is limited to what Principles 1 defines as
Category A and Category B projects.214 For Category A and B Projects,
the EPFI requires clients to illustrate an ongoing effective process of
engaging stakeholders in a structurally and culturally effective manner with the affected communities and other stakeholders.215
For projects that have potentially significant adverse impacts,
the clients must conduct informed consultation and participation.216
Principle 5 also is one of the first standards to incorporate FPIC into
its standards.217 FPIC is applicable when a project adversely impacts
indigenous people.218 As defined by the Equator Principles III, FPIC
builds on and expands the process of Informed Consultation and Participation and ensures meaningful participation by indigenous people
but does not require unanimity or contain a veto. The Equator Principles III continue to adhere to a concept more akin to the concept of
“consultation plus” contained in the IFC Performance Standards.219
The Equator Principles III applied to the Pando Project would
likely have produced a more positive HRE outcome for the affected
communities. The Pando Project would be classified as a Category A
Project due to the dam’s significantly adverse environmental impact
and social risk that are diverse and irreversible. The effective stakeholder engagement requirement would have required Electron
Investment S.A. to engage more effectively with the impacted stakeholders.220 The stakeholder engagement requirement in the Equator
212. Id. at 7.
213. Id.
214. Id. (defining Category A Projects as projects with potential significant adverse
environmental and social risks and/or impacts that are diverse, irreversible or
unprecedented; Category B Projects as projects with potential limited adverse
environmental and social risk and/or impacts that are few in number, generally sitespecific, largely reversible and readily addressed through mitigation measures; and
Category C Projects as having minimal or no adverse environmental or social risks and/or
impacts).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. EQUATOR PRINCIPLES III, supra note 122, at 8.
218. Id.
219. See generally Baker, supra note 117.
220. EQUATOR PRINCIPLES III, supra note 122, at 7 (effective stakeholder engagement
under the Equator Principles III requires demonstrating effective shareholder engagement
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Principles III would have resulted in a more predictable and less costly
outcome for the Pando Project. A more engaged approach to initial due
diligence may have led Electron Investment S.A. to address the adequacy of the flow control study and environmental impact assessment
issues early in the process, leading to reduced risk and cost savings.
As bank and corporate reputations become increasing important due to branding and imaging concerns, the goal of advancing HRE
principles will certainly grow more prominent. Beginning with the
framework contained within the Equator Principles III, there are opportunities for large and medium-sized private corporations to create
substantive beneficial outcomes to millions of people through economic
development projects. The application of the Equator Principles III will
guide those corporations by providing a framework to begin by proactively engaging in early due diligence to ensure sustainable outcomes.
CONCLUSION
A review of the pitfalls surrounding the Pando Project corroborates the concept of engaging in early proactive project due
diligence to better integrate HRE concerns. The Pando Project illustrates the potential benefits realized through early proactive due
diligence. MDBs and development companies benefit from engaging
early with the diverse and unique stakeholders inherent in each development project to create synergistic solutions to potentially competing
interests. The goal is to effectively mitigate the risk associated with
what otherwise become unresolved or ignored HRE issues. These issues then threaten the successful advancement of human rights
through economic development. Stakeholders must correspondingly be
mindful of the financial viability of economic development projects
aimed at alleviating poverty while advancing these new and important
HRE issues.
Proactive engagement begins with implementing procedural
standards aimed at engaging all affected stakeholders. Prior to approving project funding, the WBG’s role is to ensure compliance with
applicable standards while harnessing the political will to fully engage
stakeholders. The goal is to manage risk and proactively work towards
synergistic solutions. Building upon the growing value of good corpoas an ongoing process in a structured and culturally appropriate manner with the affected
communities, conducting an informed consultation and participation process, making the
appropriate assessment documentation readily available to affected communities and
disclosing environmental and social risks and adverse impacts prior to construction
commencement).
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rate citizenship, borrower developers must also recognize the economic
value in risk management, cost control, and the benefit of branding
and corporate accountability.
Development projects and developer reputations are imperiled
by the failure to proactively engage in initial project due diligence. The
borrower, the MNBs, the developing country’s national and local governments, and the growing number of NGOs must engage in early
project due diligence and develop a greater awareness of how HRE issues increasingly put projects at risk, causing harsh consequence to
human rights and economic development. Without engaging in early
due diligence, development projects not only risk irreparable harm to
indigenous peoples, affected communities, and the environment, but
also place projects at risk of failing to realize the intended economic
development outcomes.
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